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EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF ‘IN-SPACE 
JURISDICTION’: THE US APPROACH AND 
THE PROBLEMS IT IS FACING 
Frans G. von der Dunk* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As mankind moves closer to the fiftieth anniversary of the con-
clusion of the Outer Space Treaty1, the framework international 
treaty laying down the baseline regime for space activities, it may 
be considered a major achievement that the treaty, as well as some 
of its off-spring – notably the Rescue Agreement2, the Liability Con-
vention3 and the Registration Convention4 – seem to be as relevant 
as ever. This is a major feat in an international era of many funda-
mental changes in the geopolitical, economic and social context. 
Nevertheless, the increasing involvement of private entities in 
many fields of space activity, beyond the (by now) more ‘traditional’ 
ones of satellite communications and to lesser extents launching 
and satellite remote sensing, has given rise to many new legal is-
sues, even questions about the continuing validity and appropriate-
* Frans G. von der Dunk is Harvey & Susan Perlman Alumni/Othmer Professor of
Space Law at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. This paper is an adapted version of a 
White Paper “Towards the Effective Exercise of ‘In-Space’ Jurisdiction on US registered 
spacecraft? Possible US Approaches’, prepared for the 7th Annual University of Ne-
braska-Lincoln’s Washington Conference on Space Law, 3  
 1 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies London/Moscow/Wash-
ington, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereafter 
Outer Space Treaty]. 
 2 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return 
of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 
7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]. 
 3 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereafter Liability 
Convention]. 
 4 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Opened for sig-
nature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereafter Registration Conven-
tion]. 
Published in Journal of Space Law 40:1–2 (2015–2016), pp. 147–185. Copyright © 
2015 Frans G. von der Dunk. Used by permission.
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ness of the broad regime resulting from the abovementioned trea-
ties. Nowhere is this probably more true than in the case of the 
United States, the world’s leading spacefaring nation in particular 
also in the context of extended private participation in activities in 
outer space. 
In the United States, various serious commercial enterprises 
are eying the possibilities of exploiting the mineral resources of as-
teroids or other celestial bodies. Also in the United States, the var-
ious companies that are close to selling tickets to outer space to the 
rich, famous, and a few others are converging – even if Richard 
Branson’s Virgin Galactic originally was a British company, and 
SXC, planning to launch from the Dutch Caribbean island of Cura-
cao, was a Dutch company before its merger with XCOR. Except for 
satellite communications and a few isolated examples in launching 
and remote sensing operations, all private operators with advanced 
plans for, or actually ongoing, space operations are US or US-led 
companies. 
This also means that the development of legal tools within the 
United States to properly handle such new private endeavours 
should be of great interest to the rest of the world as well. Indeed, 
various non-US countries and other interested parties in this realm 
are closely following the developments within the United States in 
this regard. 
One important aspect thereof concerns the use of national leg-
islative and regulatory instruments to address international re-
sponsibility and liability of the United States under the treaties for 
the activities of such private entities in outer space or in an outer-
space-context, further to Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space 
Treaty.5 
                                                                                                                      
 5 Art. VI, Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, provides for “international responsibil-
ity for national activities in outer space, including” where “such activities are carried on 
(…) by non-governmental entities.” Art. VII provides: “Each State Party to the Treaty 
that launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space (…) and each State 
Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is internationally liable for 
damage” caused by that space object. See generally F.G. von der Dunk, Private Enterprise 
and Public Interest in the European ‘Spacescape’: Towards Harmonized National Space 
Legislation for Private Space Activities in Europe 17-26 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dis-
sertation, International Institute of Air and Space Law, Faculty of Law, Leiden Univer-
sity) and J. Nagvanshi & A. Sharma, Jurisdiction in Outer Space: Challenges of Private 
Individuals in Space in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR AND SPACE LAW 324-39 (eds. R. 
Singh, S.D. Rao & S. Kaul 2012). 
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At the same time, the United States turns out to present a ra-
ther unusual picture from the perspective of domestic implementa-
tion of international obligations under the space treaties and do-
mestically specifying the agencies exercising jurisdiction for the 
purpose. It does not have a single national framework space act 
from which all further detailed regulations follow (which is essen-
tially what all other countries with dedicated national space laws 
have availed themselves of), but a set of separate, to some extent 
even disparate national acts handling different aspects and ele-
ments. While historically understandable, and so far not having 
raised major legal problems, this is rapidly changing now under the 
pressure of such new developments as sketched above. 
For that reason, the present article addresses the US approach 
to handling its international obligations under the space treaties 
specifically vis-à-vis private actors, the issues arising from that ap-
proach and the discussions currently gearing up to try and handle 
those issues more profoundly, comprehensively and, in a sense, log-
ically. In short: how does and should, the United States arrange for 
the exercise of domestic jurisdiction over any relevant space or 
space-related operations by private actors, in line with applicable 
international law and, more precisely, in line with relevant clauses 
of the Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention. 
II. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE EXERCISE OF US ‘IN-SPACE’ 
JURISDICTION: THE PRIVATE ‘SPACESCAPE’ 
The size and importance of the US private commercial space 
industry not just for the United States but also from a global per-
spective is beyond question. It requires both appropriate levels of 
control and regulation by the US government, for purposes of na-
tional policy and compliance with relevant international obligations 
of the United States, and, to the extent compliant with interna-
tional law, appropriate stimulation equally to be reflected in legis-
lation and regulation. 
From this perspective, within the broader sector of the private 
commercial space sector, prima facie roughly seven categories of 
private commercial space activities warrant special attention, run-
ning the gamut from already being operational to being in the gen-
eral stage of preliminary mission consideration. All fundamentally 
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raise the issue of the exercise of US jurisdiction over private activi-
ties conducted in or with respect to outer space. 
The first four categories of these roughly fall within the sub-
sector of private human spaceflight, whereas the fifth and sixth cat-
egory deal with the sub-sector of private robotic on-orbit operations 
and the seventh with private exploitation of celestial bodies’ re-
sources, which for the time being is envisaged to be undertaken by 
way of unmanned missions (although this may change at a later 
stage). It is these three sub-sectors which consequently will be ad-
dressed by the present contribution. 
A. Private Human Spaceflight 
‘Private human spaceflight’ should be defined as “flights of hu-
mans intended to enter outer space (a) at their own expense or that 
of another private person or private entity, (b) conducted by private 
entities, or (c) both.”6 As said, currently this means there are four 
types of private human spaceflight at issue in the US context (or 
indeed, generally speaking, globally). 
First, there are the impending ‘space tourism’ flights of a sub-
orbital nature. Following the conquest of the X-Prize in October 
2004 especially US companies Virgin Galactic and XCOR seem to 
be getting close to launching the first commercial short-duration 
flights with paying passengers into a ‘sub-orbital’ trajectory, aiming 
for an apogee in the range of 100 to 120 km above the Earth’s sur-
face.7 
                                                                                                                      
 6 This double criterion is formulated to exclude scenarios where governments or in-
tergovernmental organizations pay for the flight of a particular human and undertake 
the actual flight operations, in which case the flight is legally speaking still comprehen-
sively ‘public’ in nature. Flights such as carried out by private operators on behalf of 
NASA however are still included by virtue of criterion (b), whereas flights such as those 
of Mr. Dennis Tito to the ISS remain included by virtue of criterion (a). See for further 
analysis Frans G. von der Dunk, Legal Aspects of Private Manned Spaceflight, in 
HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 266-67 (ed. Frans G. von der Dunk 2015); cf. E. Walter, The 
Privatisation and Commercialisation of Outer Space, in OUTER SPACE IN SOCIETY, 
POLITICS AND LAW 496-500 (eds. C. Brünner & A. Soucek 2011); M. Gerhard, Article VI 
in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, VOL. I 110-4 (eds. S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd & 
K.U. Schrogl 2009); and P. Atrey, Space Tourism – Future Industry, in in CURRENT 
DEVELOPMENTS IN AIR AND SPACE LAW 417-29 (eds. R. Singh, S.D. Rao & S. Kaul 2012). 
 7 Currently, both companies provisionally plan for such first flights to take place in 
the course of 2017 or soon thereafter. See Virgin Galactic http://www.virgingalactic.com 
(last visited July 4, 2016) and XCOR Aerospace, http://www.xcor.com (last visited July 
4, 2016). 
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Second, several US companies are currently involved in 
NASA’s Commercial Crew Development (CCDev) program in pre-
liminary work for manned space transportation8 and the follow-on 
Commercial Crew & Cargo Program (C3PO) to have privately-de-
veloped and privately-operated spacecraft transporting astronauts 
to and from the International Space Station, presumably as from 
2017 onwards.9 Recently, Space-X, Boeing and Sierra Nevada Cor-
poration have been awarded commercial crew funding through 
Space Act Agreements. While Orbital Sciences, now Orbital ATK, 
was unable to obtain NASA funding at this stage, it continues to 
develop plans for similar spaceflight projects. While the focus is on 
transporting NASA and guest astronauts to the International Space 
Station (ISS), once the technology would be proven there would be 
little doubt those companies would in principle also be interested in 
offering such orbital transportation flights to other destinations 
and/or for other customers than NASA, such as Bigelow Aerospace. 
Such operations would then raise essentially the same legal ques-
tions as sub-orbital space tourism, at least as for the outer space-
elements thereof. 
Third, the year 2001 witnessed the beginning of ‘orbital space 
tourism’ with the visit of Dennis Tito to the ISS. However, the or-
bital space tourist trips from there on were, and likely will remain 
for the foreseeable future, one-off occasions never resulting for in-
stance in two tourists being on board the ISS at the same time. 
Thus, whilst falling within the definition of private human space-
flight quoted above, this category of private human spaceflight for 
the time being would not seem to require further analysis from the 
                                                                                                                      
 8 On the COTS and CCDev programmes see FED. AVIATION ADMIN, 2011 US 
COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION DEVELOPMENTS AND CONCEPTS: VEHICLES, 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND SPACEPORTS 38-45 (Jan. 2011) available at 
https://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/me-
dia/2011%20DevCon%20Report.pdf; FED. AVIATION ADMIN.,THE ANNUAL COMPENDIUM 
OF COMMERCIAL SPACE TRANSPORTATION: 2012 60-1 (Feb. 2013) available at 
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/ast/media/Annual_Compen-
dium_of_Commercial_Space_Transportation_2012_February_2013.pdf; S. Chaddha, US 
Commercial Space Sector: Matured and Successful, 36 J. SPACE L. 29-30 (2010); and T. 
Brannen, Private Commercial Space Transportation’s Dependence on Space Tourism and 
NASA’s Responsibility to Both, 75 J. AIR L. & COMM. 667 (2010). 
 9 On the C3PO programme see Fed. Aviation Admin., ANNUAL COMPENDIUM, supra 
note 8, 60 (as consisting of ‘CCDev2’ and ‘CCiCap’); Chaddha, supra note 8, 30-1; and A. 
Lele, Security Connotations of Space Tourism, 11 ASTROPOLITICS 219-20 (2013). 
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perspective of the issue of ‘in-space jurisdiction’. Moreover, the gov-
ernmental nature of both the spacecraft flying orbital space tourists 
to their destination and back, and that destination itself – so far 
exclusively the ISS – means that the potential issues requiring the 
proper exercise of US jurisdiction in outer space over their activities 
have basically been taken care of within the legal framework per-
taining to the ISS and NASA’s leadership role in that respect.10 
Fourth, Bigelow Aerospace intends to offer ‘in-orbit’ hotel and 
other space station capacity within a few years from now.11 The ma-
jor difference between this category of private orbital tourism and 
that of orbital tourism on board the ISS concerns the private char-
acter of the former facility, which would again raise the issue of the 
appropriate exercise of – presumably – US jurisdiction on board as 
differently from that already taken care of by NASA. 
In general furthermore, the operators currently developing ve-
hicles for sub-orbital space tourism and orbital service flights are 
partly viewing their respective projects as precursors to full-fledged 
sub-orbital point-to-point transportation much along the lines of 
(international) air transportation. Such long-haul flights would 
again raise issues of jurisdiction, in particular as long as the vehi-
cles concerned would not be squarely defined as ‘aircraft,’12 so as to 
make national and international air law applicable to their opera-
tions. In the context of any such operations, the “range of in-space 
activity” conducted on board of the spacecraft would not anymore 
be, more or less, “pre-ordained” and/or remain closely related to the 
actual operation of the vehicles, but may now encompass many or-
dinary activities humans are conducting on earth all the time – and 
humans “make mistakes, commit violence, develop afflictions, and 
so on,” and may well “behave in ways that regulators have not con-
templated beforehand.”13 
Thus, each of these various impending spaceflight activities 
requires a substantive level of US regulatory control over them, 
both to comply with international obligations of the United States 
under international law and to ensure a proper and balanced legal 
                                                                                                                      
 10 See further infra, § IV.A. 
 11 See generally Bigelow Aerospace, Genesis I & II, http://bigelowaerospace.com/gen-
esis (last visited July 5, 2016). 
 12 Note the standard definition of aircraft discussed in greater detail infra, at § III.C. 
 13 B. Perlman, Grounding US Commercial Space Regulation in the Constitution, 100 
GEORGETOWN L. J. 940, 941 (2012). 
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and regulatory framework allowing this particular sector of private 
activities to prosper. Whilst a considerable body of US national law 
does in principle exist to address commercial spaceflight in general, 
under the strain of these new and rapid developments certain 
cracks, gaps and loopholes now start to become evident and call for 
a more fundamentally coherent approach. 
B. Private Robotic On-orbit Operations 
So far, two closely related categories comprise the sub-sector 
of private unmanned orbital operations: the activities of on-orbit 
servicing and active debris removal. Both these two activities, for 
economic reasons, for the time being seem to be beyond the capabil-
ity of the private sector in terms of both technologies and financial 
incentives. Even the major space-faring nations seem to stand only 
at the beginning of developing such operations in any detailed and 
structured fashion. However, on-orbit servicing proposals are cur-
rently being floated with increasing frequency and urgency, and de-
velopments could move faster than anticipated – as well as require 
substantial lead-times for complementary legal and regulatory 
tools to be developed. This would consequently still warrant taking 
them into consideration at this point in time in the discussions on 
jurisdictional issues. 
Certainly such activities would raise a number of salient and 
thorny political and additional international legal issues which 
would need to be solved before they would become feasible, notably 
the issues of international responsibility and liability, and dual-use 
technology export controls in addition to more specifically legal is-
sues such as the definition of ‘space debris’, the possibilities to le-
gally ‘abandon’ a space object and to involve insurance in the con-
text of ‘salvage’-like operations.14 
Moreover, once private operators would become involved in 
those operations, in addition essentially the same overarching issue 
of ‘in-space’ jurisdiction arises as is discussed in more detail in the 
present contribution for the areas of private human spaceflight and 
                                                                                                                      
 14 Cf. M.P. Schaefer, Analogues Between Space Law And Law Of The Sea/Interna-
tional Maritime Law: Can Space Law Usefully Borrow Or Adapt Rules From These Other 
Areas Of Public International Law?, in 2012 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTE OF SPACE LAW 316-30 (ed. Corinne Jorgenson 2013) and F. LYALL & P.B. 
LARSEN, SPACE LAW – A TREATISE 309-10 (2009). 
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private exploitation of celestial bodies’ resources. For that reason, 
from the perspective of aiming for the most comprehensive ap-
proach to the exercise of relevant US jurisdiction, on-orbit servicing 
and active debris removal should also be taken summarily into ac-
count in the present analysis. 
C. Private Exploitation of Celestial Bodies’ Resources 
Looking also into the future and for the time being not foresee-
ing manned missions, various serious projects have been an-
nounced to undertake mining missions to asteroids, most notably 
those being planned by Planetary Resources and Deep Space Indus-
tries, two US companies with major funding and expertise behind 
them. Both the former, originally founded November 2010, and the 
latter, founded January 2013, intend to follow-up reconnoitring 
missions to asteroids rich in water and other mineral resources 
with actual effort to harvest, process, and manufacture those.15 
Whilst the actual harvesting and further commercial exploita-
tion are deemed to be at least one or two decades away, in view of 
the major upfront investments in the current timeframe needed if 
these ventures are to succeed at all relatively soon more legal cer-
tainty should be offered to operators such as these two as regards 
the legal parameters, rights, and obligations which would pertain 
to their harvesting and exploitation activities once actually taking 
off.16 
Since the two leading contenders in this venture are both US 
companies, this is of primary concern for the United States within 
the broader international legal framework applicable to space ac-
tivities and its responsibility for private activities in that context. 
The exercise of US jurisdiction should thus ensure that such har-
vesting and exploitation will take place both taking into considera-
tion the international obligations of the United States in this con-
text and the interests in allowing such private companies to benefit 
                                                                                                                      
 15 See generally Planetary Resources, http://www.planetaryresources.com (last vis-
ited July 5, 2016) and Deep Space Industries, http://deepspaceindustries.com (last vis-
ited July 5, 2016). 
 16 Cf. F. TRONCHETTI, THE EXPLOITATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE MOON AND 
OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES (2010), 1-3; Lyall & Larsen, supra note 14, 190-7 and S. Hobe, 
P. Stubbe & F. Tronchetti, The 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the 
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, VOL. II 338-
41 (eds. S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd & K.U. Schrogl 2013). 
2015-2016] IN-SPACE JURISDICTION 155 
as much as possible and appropriate from their entrepreneurial ac-
tivities. 
Indeed, the US legislative branch has undertaken the first 
steps in this particular direction by enunciating the U.S. Commer-
cial Space Launch Competitiveness Act.17 Title IV of the Act ad-
dresses ‘Space Resource Exploration and Utilization’, adding a 
Chapter 513 to Title 51 of the United States Code. In terms of ju-
risdiction, it its careful to apply personal jurisdiction only, address-
ing “United States citizens” as defined and thus not claiming any 
US territorial sovereignty over celestial bodies or their resources.18 
III. THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IN OUTER SPACE SO FAR: 
THE LEGAL STATUS QUO AND THE GENERIC OPTIONS 
A. Exercising Jurisdiction in Outer Space: The General 
Framework 
‘Jurisdiction’ of a state as a key notion of public international 
law has been defined as “its lawful power to act and hence (…) its 
power to decide whether, and if so, how to act, whether by legisla-
tive, executive or judicial means”; it refers “primarily, but not ex-
clusively, [to] the lawful power to make and enforce rules.”19 It 
thereby constitutes one of the fundamental legal hallmarks of a sov-
ereign state, as opposed to non-governmental or international or-
ganizations. It is the baseline legal instrument for states also to ex-
ercise legal control for the sake of meeting responsibilities and lia-
bilities in international law. 
In view of the complexities of today’s societies, moreover, such 
jurisdiction and its exercise is in reality usually rather fragmented 
and distributed across a multiplicity of government agencies, in 
particular where it concerns the monitoring, implementation and 
                                                                                                                      
 17 U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act; Public Law 114-90, 114th 
Congress, 25 November 2015; Ch. 513, 51 U.S.C. 
 18 Sec. 51302. Note that Title IV or also explicitly refers to “accordance with the in-
ternational obligations of the United States”, referring among others to Art. II, Outer 
Space Treaty. 
 19 B.H. Oxman, Jurisdiction of States, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, vol. VI 546 (Ed. R. Wolfrum 2012). See also B. Schmidt-
Tedd & S. Mick, Article VIII, in COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW, VOL. I 156-60 (eds. 
S. Hobe, B. Schmidt-Tedd & K.U. Schrogl 2009), 156-60; Nagvanshi & Sharma, supra note 
5, 325-6; and A.J. YOUNG, LAW AND POLICY IN THE SPACE STATIONS’ ERA 152-53 (1989). 
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enforcement of laws and regulations once properly enunciated. 
Thus, national jurisdiction from that perspective can very well turn 
out be effectively exercised by a distinct subordinate body, organ, 
or even agency of the government at large, entrusted with such day-
to-day monitoring, implementation and enforcement. 
This is no different in principle for space law, even as territo-
rial jurisdiction cannot extend to outer space on a territorial basis.20 
While international space law does provide for some legal distinc-
tions between the ‘void’ of outer space itself and celestial bodies or-
biting therein, this does not extend to the application of jurisdiction 
in a generic manner.21 Also, celestial bodies cannot be appropriated 
by any particular state, hence also their national laws cannot ex-
tend to such celestial bodies as if they were outlying parts of na-
tional territory.22 
Consequently, territorial jurisdiction only applies indirectly to 
outer space activities to the extent it can be asserted over anyone 
conducting space activities from the territory of a particular state. 
On the other hand, personal jurisdiction of a state over its citizens 
(natural or legal) continues to apply as well – even if those persons 
would happen to be, and be active, in outer space. 
In addition, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides 
states with the opportunity to exercise, through registration of 
spacecraft, jurisdiction on a quasi-territorial basis on board of such 
spacecraft and even over personnel thereof if out on EVAs.23 No fur-
ther clues are offered regarding the extent or form that the exercise 
                                                                                                                      
 20 Cf. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, Art. II. 
 21 Effectively, this distinction is mainly relevant in the context of military usages of 
outer space. Cf. Id. at Art. IV, Art. XII. 
 22 From this perspective, also, the various offers to ‘buy’ plots on the Moon or other 
celestial bodies are legally speaking hoaxes, as private ownership rights over real estate 
crucially depends on national law which only applies to national territory, whereas ce-
lestial bodies could never become part of national territory. See Statement by the Board 
of Directors of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) On Claims to Property 
Rights Regarding the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, http://www.iislweb.org/docs/ 
IISL_Outer_Space_Treaty_Statement.pdf (2004) and Statement of the Board of Direc-
tors of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL). http://www.iisl-
web.org/docs/Statement%20BoD.pdf (2009). See also F.G. von der Dunk et al., Surreal 
estate: addressing the issue of ‘Immovable Property Rights on the Moon’, 20 SPACE POLICY 
151-56 (2004). 
 23 Art. VIII of the Outer Space Treaty provides: “A State Party to the Treaty on 
whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried shall retain jurisdiction and 
control over such object, and over any personnel thereof, while in outer space or on a 
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of such jurisdiction should take. Thus, the clause should be read as 
allowing individual states maximum leeway in exercising such ju-
risdiction as long as taking place within the (broad) boundaries of 
general public international law, including those pertaining to a 
state’s individual responsibility and liability. This also results from 
the precise formulation of Article VIII, which refers to the right “to 
retain jurisdiction,”24 in other words to extend existing types of ju-
risdiction as appropriate, not to create or establish a new type of 
jurisdiction. 
The application of such registration-based jurisdiction is not 
so much triggered by entry into outer space as such, but by the in-
volvement of a ‘space object,’ which in turn, due to the rather sum-
mary and partly circular definition contained in the Registration 
Convention, is usually considered to refer to man-made objects in-
tended to be launched into outer space.25 This does bring back the 
issue of delimitation of outer space, even if, as it were, through the 
backdoor – without defining the altitude which a certain object is 
intended to reach, it remains to that extent uncertain whether that 
object qualifies as a space object. Moreover, the applicability of the 
Registration Convention is generally considered to be further prem-
ised on such objects actually going into “Earth orbit or beyond.”26 
Following the Registration Convention’s regime as well as 
more generally the need to take care of international responsibility 
and liability under Articles VI and VII of the Outer Space Treaty 
and the Liability Convention, various states having sent or about 
to send space objects into outer space have asserted such jurisdic-
tion in outer space by specific, legislative means. For example, the 
United States by way of its Patents in Outer Space Act27 extended 
                                                                                                                      
celestial body.” Arts. I and II of the Registration Convention further clarify how such 
jurisdiction is to be applied. 
 24 Emphasis added. 
 25 See Registration Convention, supra note 4, Art. I(b). See also M. LACHS, THE LAW 
OF OUTER SPACE 68-9 (1972); B. Cheng, Convention on International Liability for Dam-
age Caused by Space Objects, in MANUAL ON SPACE LAW, VOL. I 116-17 (eds. N. Jasen-
tuliyana & R.S.K. Lee 1979); and G. ZHUKOV & Y. KOLOSOV, INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 
85-86 (1984). 
 26 Cf. Registration Convention, supra note 4, Art. II(1) on the national registry to be 
developed. As for the purpose of the international registery under Articles III and IV, 
the information to be provided should include “basic orbital parameters” (Art. IV(1)(d)). 
 27 Patents in Outer Space Act, Pub. L. No. 101-580; 104 Stat. 2863 (1990). 
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the scope of application of existing US patent legislation to inven-
tions made on board of US-registered space objects. Following the 
conclusion of the Intergovernmental Agreement on the ISS and the 
build-up and operation of that station, Germany and Italy have sim-
ilarly extended the scope of their national intellectual property 
right laws to – in this case – inventions made on board the Euro-
pean module of the ISS.28 
Finally, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty effectively calls 
for the exercise of at least some level of jurisdiction when it comes 
to private space activities, as it states that “[t]he activities of non-
governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing super-
vision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”29 In view of 
the close correlation to the concept of international responsibility 
as this is posited by Article VI, such authorization and continuing 
supervision should at least suffice for the state at issue to reasona-
bly assure other states that the activities at stake would be “carried 
out in conformity with the provisions set forth in the present 
Treaty,” in other words: to assure no violations of international 
space law occur.30 Thus, also the requirement of ‘continuing super-
vision’ should be read in this light as a fairly general and broad 
                                                                                                                      
 28 Agreement among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member States of 
the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian 
Federation, and the Government of the United States of America concerning Cooperation 
on the Civil International Space Station (hereafter Intergovernmental Agreement), art. 
21(2), Jan. 29 1998, T.I.A.S. No. 12927. See also A.M. Balsano & J. Wheeler, The IGA 
and ESA: Protecting Intellectual Property Rights in the Context of ISS Activities, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION 67 (eds. F.G. von der Dunk & M.M.T.A. Brus 2006). 
 29 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, Art. VI (emphasis added). Though strictly 
speaking ‘authorization and continuing supervision’ could be exercised through other 
means than the formal exercise of jurisdiction. See A. Kerrest de Rozavel & F.G. von der 
Dunk, Liability and Insurance in the Context of National Authorisation, in NATIONAL 
SPACE LEGISLATION IN EUROPE 150-5 (ed. F.G. von der Dunk 2011) on the example of 
France until the enunciation in 2008 of the Loi n 2008-518 du 3 juin 2008 relative aux 
opérations spatiales [Law on Space Operations], unofficial English translation in 34 J. 
SPACE L. 453 (2008). It is widely recognized that establishment of a national licensing 
system and appropriate form of national space legislation would offer the most compre-
hensive, transparent and effective tool for ensuring such authorization and continuing 
supervision. See also Gerhard, supra note 6, 117-22 and J. HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A 
NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION 28-60 (2004). 
 30 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, Art. VI. The reference to ‘the provisions set forth 
in the present Treaty’ is generally perceived to refer to all of international law applicable 
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provision; not as automatically requiring a level of intensive super-
vision that would fundamentally hinder any relevant activity in 
outer space. 
This represents the core of Article VI-responsibility: the focus 
is on compliance with international law, offering a structural tool 
for states to ensure such compliance also when private entities are 
involved in the space activities at issue. As the current substance 
of obligations under international space law is relatively limited in 
size and scope, in particular as regards the specifics of private ac-
tivities and their rights and interests, the requirement resting upon 
states to actually and effectively exercise and implement jurisdic-
tion could still result in a rather ‘light’ version thereof. 
In many respects it thus amounts more to a requirement to 
establish general regulatory authority in outer space than to a re-
quirement to establish detailed legislation – in the end, namely, 
this essentially is a matter of sovereign discretion, as the outer 
space treaties make clear that the states concerned are going to be 
held responsible in any event for any violation of international space 
law and liable for any damage caused by space objects launched 
with their involvement, that is in first instance regardless of 
whether they exercised this jurisdiction to any substantial extent. 
B. The Benefits of Exercising US Jurisdiction in Outer Space: 
General Aspects 
The exercise of US jurisdiction (or any national jurisdiction for 
that matter) from this perspective would also have a mirror-side to 
it which is easily overlooked in the usual anxiety of the business 
sector that the net result of the exercise of US jurisdiction would be 
the continuing establishment of new legislation stifling economic 
and private commercial development of space activities, including 
the exploitation of space resources. 
First, in view of the current absence of much international 
space law specifically targeting private space endeavours, develop-
ing the legal instruments to exercise of US jurisdiction over space 
activities and in outer space in a balanced manner might well set a 
world-wide precedent and example for an international regime and 
                                                                                                                      
to outer space activities in the light of the fundamental character of the Outer Space 
Treaty and its reference to general international law as per Art. III. 
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the substance thereof. This is, of course, precisely why the current 
analysis should also be of interest to other spacefaring nations than 
the United States to the extent that private participation in rele-
vant space activities presently is a fact or at least envisaged fairly 
soon. 
In 1945 the Truman Declaration establishing the concept of 
the Continental Shelf31 as endowing coastal states with the entitle-
ment to exercise jurisdiction over economic exploitation of the min-
eral resources in the area at issue including the right to license pri-
vate operators within its jurisdiction in that context quickly evolved 
into an international rule of customary law ultimately also en-
shrined in international treaties. Similarly, a profound and bal-
anced effort at establishing a detailed level of control over private 
entities and their space operations might evolve into the interna-
tional standard and beyond that into proper international law. In 
such a manner any risk that an international regime adopted by 
other states could arise which might be contrary to the rights and 
interests of both the United States and US private enterprise would 
at least largely be pre-empted. 
Currently, for example, the envisaged activities of extraterres-
trial mineral resource exploitation operators such as Deep Space 
Industries and Planetary Resources would, though under present 
international space law not prohibited as such, meet with too many 
legal uncertainties for a reasonably secure investment climate.32 
Such uncertainties concern, among others, their rights to operate 
in certain areas of outer space or celestial bodies exclusively (that 
is with an accompanying right to keep others out of such areas 
                                                                                                                      
 31 Proclamation No. 2667, Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf (Sept. 28, 1945), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=12332. See also P.T. Stoll, Continental Shelf, in 
THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. II 720 (ed. R. 
Wolfrum 2012) and M.D. Evans, The Law of the Sea, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 642 (ed. 
M.D. Evans 2003). 
 32 The ‘global commons’ status of outer space and the fundamental freedom of space 
activities, including notably exploration and use of outer space, as per Arts. I and II of 
the Outer Space Treaty, are currently perceived by most countries and experts to legiti-
mize any exploitation for commercial purposes as long as other parameters and obliga-
tions of international (space) law are complied with, but in view of the absence of any 
specific rules on this and the opposition of a still-sizeable portion of world community 
and authors alike to such legitimacy, any actual exploitative operations might continue 
to give rise to considerable international controversy, essentially at a political level but 
likely spilling over soon into the legal domain. 
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and/or under what conditions) and the extent to which their owner-
ship of extracted minerals would be contested by other countries or 
their entities, not only politically but also legally. A rudimentary 
legal framework addressing such issues is therefore needed at the 
international level, and US efforts to achieve such a framework at 
least nationally might well lead the way here. 
Once again, an example from the law of the sea would be elu-
cidating. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea had provided for application of a ‘common heritage of mankind’ 
regime to the ocean floor and the mineral resources to be discovered 
thereon, including notably technology-transfer and benefit-sharing 
commitments.33 Those clauses were considered by the United 
States and other leading Western countries to stifle commercial ex-
ploitation initiatives in that area, and by that token inacceptable. 
These states by and large refused to ratify the Convention, and in-
stead in some cases developed national ocean floor mining licensing 
regimes to be applied unilaterally to any relevant private party so 
interested.34 
When a 1994 de facto amendment of the 1982 Convention how-
ever resulted in considerable mitigation of the disputed clauses, 
most of those countries became parties to the 1982 Convention as 
per that 1994 Agreement, which had meanwhile entered into force 
and was enjoying continuously increasing partisanship.35 More and 
                                                                                                                      
 33 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Arts. 133-
191, esp. Arts. 136-137, 144, 150-153, 170, Dec. 10 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS]. See also L. VIIKARI, FROM MANGANESE NODULES TO LUNAR REGOLITH 52ff 
(2002). 
 34 This notably concerned the 1980 US Deep Sea Bed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 
30 U.S.C. Secs. 1401 et seq. (2016); 1981 West German Act on the Interim Regulation of 
Deep Sea Bed Mining, 20 I.L.M. 393 (1981); 1981 UK Deep Sea Bed Mining (Temporary 
Provisions) Act, Ch. 53, 20 I.L.M. 1219 (1981); 1982 French Deep Seabed Mineral Re-
sources Exploration and Mining Law, Loi no. 81-1135, 21 I.L.M. 808 (1982); 1982 Japa-
nese Law on Interim Measures for Deep Seabed Mining, 22 I.L.M. 102 (1983) and Italian 
Law No. 41 of 1985, 24 I.L.M. 983 (1985). See also Tronchetti, supra note 16, 104-13 and 
Viikari, supra note 32, Ch. 4. 
 35 This concerned the Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 New York, July 
28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereafter New York Agreement]. The New York Agreement 
amounted to an understanding to interpret and apply the disputed Part XI-clauses of 
the 1982 Convention in a much more private enterprise-friendly way. See Viikari, supra 
note 32, 73-8 and Tronchetti, supra note 16, 113-8. 
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more, the United States came to stand alone in refusing to ratify 
the Convention and formally adhere to the resulting legal regime. 
Any US private company favouring the very-pro-private-enter-
prise regime that the United States continued to apply domesti-
cally, might therefore perhaps legally-technically speaking have 
been at liberty to ignore the international licensing regime now in 
existence under the revised regime, and (just) apply for a US li-
cense. Nevertheless, once Lockheed Martin was quite far advanced 
in actually initiating ocean floor harvesting activities, rather than 
take that route, it established a UK subsidiary, UK Seabed Re-
sources specifically to apply for a UK license.36 The United Kingdom 
meanwhile having become a party to the 1982 Convention as per 
the 1994 Agreement, such a license would be subject to the interna-
tional legal parameters and boundaries established by the latter. 
The benefit of a license enjoying almost world-wide recognition and 
respect obviously outweighed any licensing and operating require-
ments that would be more burdensome on the US operator than 
those that would have applied under a national US license. 
Thus, while a unilateral national regime is exactly what Title 
IV of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act is 
trying to achieve, if such a regime ultimately is to be found at fun-
damental odds with any emerging global regime outside the United 
States, its value might become intrinsically marginalized or at least 
subject to serious repercussions, if not legal than political. This is 
also why the Act makes reference to the obligation of the US Presi-
dent to “(1) facilitate commercial exploration for and commercial 
recovery of space resources by United States citizens; (2) discourage 
government barriers to the development in the United States of eco-
nomically viable, safe, and stable industries for commercial explo-
ration for and commercial recovery of space resources in manners 
consistent with the international obligations of the United States; 
and (3) promote the right of United States citizens to engage in com-
mercial exploration for and commercial recovery of space resources 
                                                                                                                      
 36 See UK Government sponsors Lockheed Martin, Lockheed Martin UK subsidiary 
for licence to harvest Polymetallic Nodules, Mar. 14, 2013, 
http://www.lockheedmartin.com/uk/news/press-releases/2013-press-releases/uk-
government-sponsors-lockheed-martin-uk-subsidiary-for-licence.html. 
2015-2016] IN-SPACE JURISDICTION 163 
free from harmful interference, in accordance with the interna-
tional obligations of the United States and subject to authorization 
and continuing supervision by the Federal Government.”37 
The Act effectively guarantees the protection of legitimate 
ownership rights in resources once extracted, as well as judicial 
means to solve disputes concerning conflicting exploitation activi-
ties, as long as in conformity with US obligations under interna-
tional space law.38 Whether the balance between such conformity 
with international obligations and providing private operators with 
sufficient legal guarantees is actually appropriately achieved, how-
ever, as indicated is already subject to debate, evidencing the exist-
ence of the current legal gaps.39 
Second, the establishment and exercise of US jurisdiction in 
outer space and/or over private space activities also means that the 
United States as a sovereign power squarely endorses activities al-
lowed following the exercise of such jurisdiction, and would be le-
gally entitled under general public international law to exercise so-
called diplomatic protection with regard to the interests of US enti-
ties if legally challenged by other countries or their entities. Fur-
ther to such exercise, for example specific protection zones and 
property rights can be established which could be upheld against 
such foreign claims, since they can be defended as a logical – and so 
far really the only – elaboration of the rather general principles per-
taining to safety zones and suchlike.40 This presumes developments 
such as have taken place with regard to the ocean floor regime 
would not take place with regard to outer space or its celestial bod-
ies – in other words: where a domestic US regime to be developed 
would come to lack any international recognition, it might actually 
backfire. 
                                                                                                                      
 37 Sec. 51302. 
 38 See Sec. 51303. 
 39 Cf. e.g. F. Tronchetti, Private property rights on asteroid resources: Assessing the 
legality of the ASTEROIDS Act, 30 SPACE POL’Y 193-6 (2014). 
 40 Cf. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, Art. XII requiring “reasonable advance no-
tice of a projected visit” to “stations, installations, equipment and space vehicles on the 
Moon and other celestial bodies.” 
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C. Exercising Jurisdiction Specifically vis-á-vis Human 
Spaceflight 
So far in the context of human spaceflight, jurisdictional issues 
in a broad sense have remained confined to the relatively few in-
stances of public human spaceflight, where the capacity of the as-
tronauts and cosmonauts as employees of governmental space 
agencies basically guaranteed the appropriate level of exercise of 
jurisdiction over their behaviour, largely already by way of their 
employment contracts. Thus, even in the context of the ISS, the 
most pronounced legal environment for human space operations in 
view of the multi-national construction, it generally sufficed for 
each partner to register its own modules per Article 5 of the Inter-
governmental Agreement. Apart from the specific issue of intellec-
tual property rights referred to above only the issue of possible ex-
ercise of criminal jurisdiction needed to be more specifically ad-
dressed, which was effectuated by means of Article 22.41 
With the impending likely arrival on the scene of private ‘space 
tourism’ flights however, this picture will change profoundly. For 
the time being, the flights contemplated by those operators perhaps 
will remain little more than sub-orbital hops, barely entering into 
outer space before starting to re-enter, but for the further future 
they intend to aim for longer flights, from sub-orbital transporta-
tion between various continents to semi-orbital or orbital transpor-
tation to ‘space hotels’ such as Bigelow is in the process of develop-
ing. Essentially, spaceflight participants who have no employment 
contract with a space agency but fly on their own account and out 
of their own interest – and whose selection and training, even if not 
negligible, will be far less extensive than those of professional as-
tronauts and cosmonauts – will enter outer space in a purely pri-
vate context. 
From the perspective of current space law, the first issue 
which then arises in the context of the jurisdictional questions is 
the aforementioned fact that the Registration Convention, provid-
ing the default instrument to establish and exercise jurisdiction 
over spacecraft, only formally addresses space objects “launched 
                                                                                                                      
 41 Intergovernmental Agreement, supra note 27, Art. 22 addresses this issue by in 
first instance allowing individual states to exercise active personal jurisdiction over per-
sonnel for criminal law purposes, adding a certain fallback option for other duly affected 
states to exercise criminal jurisdiction. 
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into Earth orbit or beyond.”42 This has usually been taken to mean 
that sub-orbital flights like the ones envisaged by Virgin Galactic 
and XCOR would not be subject to the Convention’s regime. How-
ever, the phrasing ‘Earth orbit or beyond’ would seem to refer to a 
certain area being (intended to be) reached by the space object at 
issue for the Convention to apply. So a sub-orbital space object 
which would achieve an altitude ‘beyond’ an ‘Earth orbit’ – in other 
words, in outer space as it is most commonly defined with reference 
to the lowest-orbit approach – could well fall within the ambit of the 
Convention.43 
In addition, Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, which al-
lows states to retain jurisdiction over space objects launched into 
outer space, does not limit such retention of jurisdiction to space 
objects ‘launched into Earth orbit or beyond’. As soon as a space 
object is intended to reach an area called ‘outer space,’ the state 
registering it may exercise its jurisdiction over and on board of that 
space object. To the extent therefore these two phrases – of ‘Earth 
orbit or beyond’ and ‘outer space’ – would not be seen as referring 
to the same geographical area, it is the ‘outer space’ label of the two 
which prevails in determining, for example, whether an object trig-
gers the application most notably of the Liability Convention, since 
that is the term used by that Convention.44 
In other words: the national jurisdiction of a registration state 
of a space object, as provided for and regulated by Article VIII of the 
Outer Space Treaty and the Registration Convention, principally 
allows exercise of such jurisdiction over that object in outer space 
regardless of whether any orbit(al velocity) has been or will be 
achieved – or was even aimed for. 
In the absence of a well-established and generally-acknowl-
edged lower boundary of outer space, however, in particular within 
the United States, the question as to whether the sub-orbital vehi-
cles now giving rise to the discussion regarding ‘on-orbit jurisdic-
tion’ would (intend to) enter into outer space can not be definitively 
answered. This also means that the question whether they are 
                                                                                                                      
 42 Registration Convention, supra note 4, Art. II(1). 
 43 See for a very extended analysis and argument F.G. von der Dunk, Beyond What? 
Beyond Earth orbit?...! The Applicability of the Registration Convention to Private Com-
mercial Manned Sub-Orbital Spaceflight”, 43 CAL. W. INT’L L. J. 269-341 (2013). 
 44 See Liability Convention, supra note 3, Arts. I-V. 
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‘space objects’ in the sense of the space treaties cannot be finally 
answered – at least not authoritatively as for the United States.45 
At the same time, in view of their technologies and intended 
trajectories and activities, the only reasonable alternative to quali-
fying those vehicles as ‘space objects’ would be to qualify them as 
‘aircraft.’ ‘Aircraft’ have been defined as “any machine that can de-
rive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other 
than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.”46 The In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), though acknowl-
edging the applicability of the general definition of ‘aircraft’ to most 
of the vehicles currently being designed for private sub-orbital 
flight, decided to desist so far from developing Standards and Rec-
ommended Practices (SARPs) for such sub-orbital vehicles or the 
operations conducted with them.47 On the other hand, at this point 
in time ICAO seems to be reconsidering such an approach once 
more.48 
In the last resort however, this would not make a principled 
difference. Also a qualification of the vehicles at issue as ‘aircraft’ 
would still give rise to the full-fledged possibility for the state con-
cerned to exercise jurisdiction on board of that vehicle, as “[a]ircraft 
                                                                                                                      
 45 It may be noted however that outside the United States a growing convergence of 
opinion on an altitude of 100 km (62.5 miles) as the legal boundary between airspace and 
outer space can be discerned. Also, within the United States, that particular altitude has 
already popped up in the context of (non-legal) federal agency documents, state legisla-
tion discussions, and – of course – the private operators touting their incumbent sub-
orbital flights as entering into outer space; see further F.G. von der Dunk, International 
Space Law, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE LAW 64-72 (ed. F.G. von der Dunk 2015). 
 46 See Convention on Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chi-
cago Convention]; Annex 7, Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks, at definitions 
(5th ed. 2003) available at http://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/ 
NationalityMarks/annexes_booklet_en.pdf; Annex 8, Airworthiness of aircraft, at defini-
tions (10th ed., April 2005) available at http://www.icao.int/safety/airnavigation/Nation-
alityMarks/ 
annexes_booklet_en.pdf. See also V.J. Vissepó, Legal Aspects of Reusable Launch Vehi-
cles, 31 J. SPACE L. 185-9 (2005). 
 47 See Working Paper on Concept of Suborbital Flights, ICAO Council, 175th Ses-
sion, C-WP/12436 (May 30, 2005. See generally T.R. Hughes & E. Rosenberg, Space 
Travel Law (and Politics): The Evolution of the Commercial Space Launch Amendments 
Act of 2004, 31 J. SPACE L. 76-77 (2005) and Vissepó, supra note 43, 179-85. SARPs are 
the detailed elaborations of general obligations and requirements under the regime cre-
ated by the Chicago Convention. 
 48 Cf. Reuters: A. Lampert, UN Aviation body to mull space safety as space taxis 
ready for flight, REUTERS, Sept 19, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ 
2014/09/19/aerospace-space-icao-idUKL1N0RK2LS20140919. 
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have the nationality of the State in which they are registered,”49 
and such nationality ipso facto allows the state of nationality to ex-
ercise its national jurisdiction on board. 
In other words, it would even be possible for the United States 
to start addressing the issue of fundamental and comprehensive ju-
risdiction on board of US-registered sub-orbital, orbital or beyond-
orbital vehicles for the time being without having to address the 
question of where outer space should be deemed to begin. After all, 
this jurisdiction would focus on the registration of vehicles and the 
resulting right to exercise jurisdiction in first instance regardless of 
whether the registered vehicles would be registered as aircraft, as 
space objects or even as both at the same time.50 
D. Exercising Jurisdiction Specifically vis-á-vis Resource 
Exploitation 
In the absence of specific possibilities for states to regulate the 
exploitation of mineral resources on celestial bodies on a ‘tradi-
tional’ basis due to the legal impossibility to exercise territorial ju-
risdiction on such celestial bodies, basically only two theoretical ap-
proaches would be available to establish a certain level of legal cer-
tainty regarding the applicable rights and obligations for potential 
private exploitation missions. 
The one option concerns the development of an international 
regime somehow allowing private entities to be licensed to under-
take exploitation activities on celestial bodies within a set of rules 
further specified by an international instrument. Noting that also 
the high seas constitute an area outside of any individual state’s 
territorial jurisdiction, this approach was originally used in the con-
text of deep seabed mining, where the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea51 provided for a complicated system of exploi-
tation licenses under an international regime. As discussed, only 
after a considerable restructuring of the original approach, bending 
                                                                                                                      
 49 Chicago Convention, supra note 43, Art. 17. 
 50 It should be noted that analyses of these issues so far largely ignore the possibility 
for (component parts of) a vehicle ab initio to be registered as both an aircraft and a 
space object, and assume for instance that registration as an aircraft automatically and 
comprehensively excludes the possibility of concurrent registration as a space object. 
 51 See UNCLOS, supra note 32. 
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the regime to make it considerably more market-friendly, did this 
regime start to achieve world-wide credibility and acceptance.52 
For similar reasons, the approach taken by the Moon Agree-
ment,53 which also applies to other celestial bodies in the solar sys-
tem, did not go very far. While it is in force, it is in force only for 
sixteen non-major-spacefaring nations, thus strictly speaking 
would not constitute an obstacle for inter alia the United States to 
take a different approach. At the same time, the Moon Agreement’s 
lack of credibility and widespread adherence also means there is 
essentially no internationally-agreed legal regime of appreciable 
detail applicable to any prospective mining operations, allowing 
major uncertainties to remain as the Outer Space Treaty continues 
to apply but does not provide much helpful specifics. 
The other option follows a unilateral bottom-up approach, 
whereby individual states license national operators under national 
regimes, basically on the basis of personal jurisdiction, to proceed 
with such exploitation activities. Even if such national licenses 
would be granted in full deference to existing international law on 
the subject, the risks of unenforceability of licensee rights under 
such national licensing regimes against third states and their enti-
ties, and of competing claims to particular areas considered of in-
terest would present a major level of legal uncertainty, which might 
well make celestial bodies resource exploitation an already legally 
speaking very risky venture.54 
At the same time, as long as the number of countries poten-
tially capable of undertaking (or allowing their private operators to 
undertake) such activities would remain fairly small, such a na-
tional approach may well be the starting point from various per-
spectives. It would co-determine the international regime which 
would ultimately have to arise for full-fledged global acceptability 
of a particular national system, such as by requiring ‘due care’ for 
                                                                                                                      
 52 As discussed, this was achieved mainly by way of the New York Agreement, supra 
note 34. 
 53 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies New York, Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereafter Moon Agreement]. 
 54 Cf. the discussion supra at § II.B. 
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other states’ activities for example under Article IX of the Outer 
Space Treaty.55 
IV. THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION OVER SPACE OBJECTS IN 
THE US CONTEXT 
Other countries have so far established a single coherent piece 
of national space legislation to ensure the desired level of exercise 
of national jurisdiction over duly registered space objects,56 which 
also testifies to the fundamental interest in such exercise being 
both comprehensive and coherent. By contrast, however, the situa-
tion in the US context has developed into a complicated one by the 
existence of a number of acts and statutes addressing specific as-
pects or elements of space operations conducted with US spacecraft 
and/or by US private operators. 
A. NASA ‘Jurisdiction’ over Human Space Activities 
To the extent the United States itself has been involved in hu-
man spaceflight and this was considered to require any exercise of 
jurisdiction on the part of the US government, NASA was the gov-
ernmental agency to handle this, being tasked to “exercis[e] control 
over aeronautical and space activities sponsored by the United 
States.”57 Thus, the NASA Administrator “shall be responsible for 
the exercise of all powers and the discharge of all duties of the Ad-
ministration and shall have authority and control over all person-
nel and activities thereof.”58 
As already indicated, the application of US jurisdiction to com-
pletely public space operations and spacecraft did consequently not 
                                                                                                                      
 55 The Outer Space Treaty thus provides “States Parties to the Treaty (…) shall con-
duct all their activities in outer space (…) with due regard to the corresponding interests 
of all other States Parties to the Treaty.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, Art. IX 
 56 See e.g. the United Kingdom, Outer Space Act, 1986, c. 38, Sec. 1 (U.K.) (“This Act 
applies to (...) any activity in outer space.”); Russia, , Law of the Russian Federation on 
Space Activities, No. 5663-1, Art. 9(2), 1993 in NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION OF THE 
WORLD, VOL. I 101 (2001) (“Subject to licensing shall be the space activities (...)” in con-
junction with Art. 2(1), defining the term “space activities” for the purposes of the Law); 
and Sweden, Act on Space Activities, 1982:963, Sec. 1 in NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION 
OF THE WORLD, VOL. I 398 (2001) (“This Act applies to activities in outer space (space 
activities).”). 
 57 51 U.S.C. § 20102(b). 
 58 51 U.S.C. § 20111(a). 
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require specific acts of extension of such jurisdiction since the na-
tionality of the people, entities and craft59 involved guaranteed that 
at least US personal jurisdiction, as well as, through the contract of 
government-employed astronauts, effective control by the relevant 
government agency could be asserted.60 
This also applied to the US contribution to, and activities un-
dertaken in, the context of the ISS, where obviously modules from 
other states, registered with such states, as well as astronauts and 
cosmonauts from other states were also implicated, and issues of 
jurisdiction had to be carefully and internationally negotiated. The 
only specific elements to be further so arraigned, as discussed, con-
cerned criminal law, where NASA would not have any such juris-
diction properly speaking,61 and intellectual property jurisdiction, 
which involves NASA potentially only as an intellectual property-
owner.62 
It was NASA therefore which took care (as far as the US inter-
ests were concerned) of the complications caused by the visit of the 
first ‘space tourist’ to the ISS in 2001. It did so by firstly agreeing 
with Russia and the other ISS partners on a special ad hoc arrange-
ment, taking care of, among other issues, potential third-party lia-
bility risks resulting from the visit of Tito. NASA then concluded 
with the ISS partners the Principles Regarding Processes and Cri-
teria for Selection, Assignment, Training and Certification of ISS 
(Expedition and Visiting) Crewmembers towards the end of 2001.63 
                                                                                                                      
 59 Though formally speaking, Art. VIII of the Outer Space Treaty does not provide 
for a ‘nationality’ of a spacecraft, for all practical purposes the effect of registration of a 
space object amounts to precisely that, following from the fundamental right to exercise 
jurisdiction on a quasi-territorial basis and the fact that a space object can only have one 
registration state. Cf. Registration Convention, supra note 4, Art. II(2). 
 60 See also Young, supra note 18, 154-6. 
 61 The registration of the US modules, as per Art. 5 of the Intergovernmental Agree-
ment, basically could have allowed US criminal law to be applied on board those modules 
on a quasi-territorial basis, were it not that Art. 22 imposed nationality as the basis for 
exercising jurisdiction in a criminal law context. Intergovernmental Agreement, supra 
note 27, Art. 5. In view of its nature, NASA obviously would not be part of any such US 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction, but that is essentially a US sovereign choice, not predi-
cated by international law. See also infra § V. 
 62 Cf. 51 U.S.C. § 20135 for the relevant arrangements in US law in this context. See 
also Young, supra note 18, 171-4. 
 63 At Principles Regarding Processes and Criteria for Selection, Assignment, Train-
ing and Certification of ISS (Expedition and Visiting) Crewmembers, http://www.spac-
eref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=4578 (Nov. 2001). See also R.P. Veldhuyzen & T.L. Mas-
son-Zwaan, ESA Policy and Impending Legal Framework for Commercial Utilisation of 
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This document defines ‘spaceflight participants’ as including crew-
members of non-Partner space agencies, engineers, scientists, 
teachers, journalists, filmmakers or tourists, and provides for spe-
cific guidance regarding the extent to and conditions under which 
amongst others such tourists might be allowed on board of the ISS. 
Whilst it still makes sense to have NASA continuing to exer-
cise this pragmatic version of US jurisdiction in the specific context 
of NASA-operated, -owned, and -controlled spacecraft, vice versa 
any extension of such exercise of jurisdiction outside of that context 
makes considerably less sense – and consequently is unlikely to 
come about. Even where the option of NASA astronauts flying on 
private vehicles is now being arranged for within the federal gov-
ernment, this only addresses the issue of whether the Federal Avi-
ation Administration’s (FAA) exercise of its jurisdiction over such 
private vehicles, notably the safety-related aspects of their flights, 
is sufficient for NASA to ‘entrust’ its astronauts to flights on them.64 
B. FCC Jurisdiction over Space Communication Activities  
Ever since the 1934 Communications Act, the US Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has the authority to license 
the use of “all the channels of radio transmission” within the United 
States or from US-registered vessels or aircraft elsewhere,65 which 
as of 1970 has officially been confirmed to include the licensing com-
petence vis-à-vis persons or entities interested in operating such 
channels to or from satellites in outer space.66 In other words, with 
the help of licenses the United States through the FCC in principle 
                                                                                                                      
the European Columbus Laboratory Module of the ISS, in THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE 
STATION 54-6 (eds. F.G. von der Dunk & M.M.T.A. Brus 2006). 
 64 See, for example, D. Messier, NASA, FAA Cooperate on Commercial Crew Pro-
gram, PARABOLIC ARC, Feb., 27 2014, http://www.parabolicarc.com/ 
2014/02/27/nasa-faa-cooperate-commercial-crew-program/. For the FAA’s exercise of ju-
risdiction, see infra § IV.D. 
 65 , Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 151, §301 (2016). The scope of the Act does not 
only refer to US territory, but also includes in quasi-territorial fashion vessels and air-
craft with US nationality. See P.A. Vorwig, Regulation of Satellite Communications in 
the United States, in NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 422ff (ed. R.S. Jakhu 
2010) and P.A. SALIN, SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS REGULATIONS IN THE EARLY 21ST 
CENTURY 149-90 (2000). 
 66 See Establishment of Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities by Non-Gov-
ernmental Entities, Report and Order, 22 F.C.C. 2d 86, Appendix C, p. 1 (1970). 
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exercises jurisdiction over any satellite or other spacecraft – includ-
ing human – operated from US territory or US-registered vessels or 
aircraft, namely to the extent that the use of radio transmission 
channels is at issue. 
As to this licensing competence, furthermore, it allows the 
FCC both to ensure upfront, by way of the license requirements, 
that the use of radio channels in outer space will take place in con-
formity with the requirements considered necessary by the US gov-
ernment, and to monitor (at least in theory; with spacecraft obvi-
ously site visits are impossible and monitoring could only be done 
by radio-contact and other telemetry, tracking, and control devices) 
that post-grant the licensee will continue to comply with such re-
quirements.67 
By definition, however, this is limited to those requirements 
predicated by the FCC, hence effectively envisaged necessary prior 
to the actual launch of the space object (although there would be a 
limited opportunity to suspend a license post-grant in case one of 
the events specifically listed would occur68), and then of course only 
limited to those related to the actual use of radio channels. A fall-
back clause offering further possibilities to exercise jurisdiction also 
post-launch arises from the authority to “[m]ake such rules and reg-
ulations and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not incon-
sistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of 
this chapter, or any international radio or wire communications 
treaty or convention, or regulations annexed thereto, including any 
treaty or convention insofar as it relates to the use of radio, to which 
the United States is or may hereafter become a party.”69 
An interesting final element in the exercise of FCC jurisdic-
tion, in particular within the context of active debris removal, con-
cerns the imposition by the FCC in the context of licensing satellite 
operators of orbital debris mitigation standards, notably an orbital 
                                                                                                                      
 67 Cf. Communications Act, supra note 62, § 303, esp. sub (b), (e), (f), (h)-(n) for such 
requirements and monitoring competences. See also Id. at §§ 307, 308, 312, 318. 
 68 See id. at §§303(m)(1), 316. 
 69 Id. at §303(r). While this provision has purportedly on occasion been used to ad-
dress ‘character’ violations, including court-adjudicated criminal conduct unconnected as 
such to the radio station’s activities, it remains questionable to what extent the FCC 
might be the proper authority to address such criminal law issues – read: whether this 
does not amount to a certain ‘competence creep’, better to be undercut by way of proper 
establishment of jurisdiction of the appropriate US authorities. 
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debris mitigation plan. This particular FCC authority emanates 
from a primary responsibility to license the use of satellites and op-
erations for the general public’s benefit also beyond the core of li-
censing their use of radio frequencies and orbital positions, and to 
effectively ensure that the occupation of orbital positions during or 
beyond the operational life of the satellite does not result in undue 
hazards to others operating in the same environment – or indeed to 
third-parties elsewhere, in particular on the ground.70 
At the same time, the Commercial Space Launch Act71 pro-
vides for the FAA’s AST (the present ‘label’ of the Office for Com-
mercial Space Transportation) to undertake a payload review for 
every launch to be licensed with the aim “to determine whether (…) 
launch [of the payload] would jeopardize public health and safety, 
safety of property, U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, 
or international obligations of the United States.”72 From that per-
spective, one could even argue that the FCC’s exercise of its juris-
diction on this particular issue amounts to a sort of ‘competence 
creep,’ as orbital debris only tangentially relates to the proper issue 
of use of radio frequencies over which the FCC’s core regulatory au-
thority is to be exercised and would, from many perspectives, be 
more logically included as part of the payload review to be con-
ducted by the FAA’s AST.73 
In any event, neither of the two would be able to currently ad-
dress in any comprehensive fashion an effort at active debris re-
moval. And while certainly laudable from an overall perspective of 
preserving outer space for future activities and developing interna-
tional (space) law on the matter, this FCC ‘competence creep’ again 
                                                                                                                      
 70 47 U.S.C. §303. Licenses should be handed out only if, i.a., “the public interest” 
will be served thereby. Id. at § 309. See also 47 C.F.R. Pts 5, 25 & 97 (2016); and Futron, 
Orbital Debris Mitigation: Regulatory Challenges and Market Opportunities, at 3 (Mar. 
15 2006). 
 71 Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575 (1984). See also infra §IV.D. 
 72 14 C.F.R. 415.51. For purposes of this review, the FAA AST will notably consult 
with the Departments of Defense, Department of State, and any other appropriate fed-
eral agencies such as NASA. See §415.57. For more on the FAA’s role see infra §IV.D. 
 73 It may be further noted that NASA, inter alia giving rise to its role in co-estab-
lishing the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee, had started to address 
space debris and relevant mitigation measures as early as the beginning of the 1980s. 
See C. Williams, Space: The Cluttered Frontier, 60 J. AIR L. & COMM. 1166-67 (1995) and 
P.S. Dempsey, Overview of the United States Space Policy and Law, in NATIONAL 
REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 392 (ed. R.S. Jakhu 2010). 
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raises issues as to how the exercise of US jurisdiction in outer space 
more generally should be established on a more coherent footing. 
C. NOAA Jurisdiction over Space Remote Sensing Activities  
A further US government entity exercising some substantial 
and direct measure of US jurisdiction over space activities concerns 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
within the Department of Commerce. Under the two national acts 
addressing the licensing of private remote sensing satellite opera-
tors, the 1984 Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act74 as 
then superseded by the 1992 Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act,75 
NOAA was the government agency actually handling the licens-
ing.76 The licensing competence refers to private remote sensing 
systems, more particularly their operation and the follow-on han-
dling of data generation, treatment, and distribution – and to only 
those aspects.77 
Whilst the soon-to-be-expected private sub-orbital flights may 
not likely become involved in remote sensing operations (which 
would then essentially be private in nature, hence possibly subject 
to the application of the Land Remote-Sensing Policy Act), some-
what further into the future one cannot exclude such involvement 
either. The two currently leading contenders in prospective sub-or-
bital ‘space tourism’, Virgin Galactic and XCOR, have both indi-
cated they would also entertain opportunities to fly certain small 
experimental payloads into the lower regions of outer space, and 
sooner or later a research or other institute might be interested in 
flying a remote sensing-experiment, with or without an accompa-
nying researcher on board. At the same time, the general under-
standing is that NOAA jurisdiction is even further limited to orbit-
ing remote sensing devices; excluding for example at least accord-
ing to the letter both Moon missions and the aforementioned sub-
orbital flights. 
                                                                                                                      
 74 Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act, Pub. L. No. 98-365 (1984). 
 75 Land Remote Sensing Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 102-555 (1992). See also E. Sadeh, 
Politics and Regulation of Earth Observation Services in the United States in NATIONAL 
REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 455-58 (ed. R.S. Jakhu 2010). 
 76 See 51 U.S.C. §60121. 
 77 51 U.S.C. § 60121(a). cf. esp. sub (2): “In the case of a private space system that is 
used for remote sensing and other purposes, the authority of the Secretary under this 
subchapter shall be limited only to the remote sensing operations of such space system.” 
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D. FAA Jurisdiction over Private Human Spaceflight 
 
Obviously, the most directly relevant element of US jurisdic-
tion for the current discussion is that of the FAA over private hu-
man spaceflight. Like the specific US government agency compe-
tences of FCC and NOAA addressed above, this competence also 
started out as a competence addressing robotic space activities. 
When in 1984 with the Commercial Space Launch Act78 the 
first fundamental possibility was created for private entities to 
start engaging in the provision of launch services for commercial 
purposes subject to a licensing regime, under the Secretary of 
Transportation’s responsibility the Office for Commercial Space 
Transportation (OCST), which eleven years later was relocated’ to 
the FAA, was made directly responsible for properly licensing those 
activities.79 
Addressing the relevant possibilities for such private launch 
service providers to offer launches with expendable launch vehicles 
to customers interested in having their payload – usually a com-
mercial communication satellite – launched into the desired orbit, 
the licensing focused essentially on the launch phase. This phase 
was supposed to begin at the “commencement of licensed launch 
activities” and to end, for “orbital launches, until the later of (i) 
Thirty days following payload separation, or attempted payload 
separation in the event of a payload separation anomaly; or (ii) 
Thirty days from ignition of the launch vehicle.”80 For non-orbital 
launches, this phase supposedly came to an end upon “completion 
                                                                                                                      
 78 See Commercial Space Launch Act, supra note 68. See also P.A. Vorwig, Regula-
tion of Private Launch Services in the United States in NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE 
ACTIVITIES 405-16 (ed. R.S. Jakhu 2010). 
 79 Cf. 51 U.S.C. §50903(d), indicating that the Secretary of Transportation, formally 
charged under the Act with supervising commercial launches, could call upon an execu-
tive agency to perform such tasks; in conjunction with § 50921, headed “Office of Com-
mercial Space Transportation.” 
 80 14 C.F.R. §440.11. Note that this ‘definition’ strictly speaking remains confined to 
the required insurance coverage or financial responsibility of the licensee. The Commer-
cial Space Launch Act itself does not define launch other than as the effort “to place or 
try to place a launch vehicle or re-entry vehicle and any payload, crew, or space flight 
participant from Earth (A) in a suborbital trajectory, (B) in Earth orbit in outer space; 
or (C) otherwise in outer space, including activities involved in the preparation of a 
launch vehicle or payload for launch.” 51 U.S.C. Sec. 50902(4). See also Kerrest de 
Rozavel & Von der Dunk, supra note 28, 146. 
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of licensed launch activities at the launch site,” which presumably 
includes flight control and monitoring of the launch at the launch 
site.81 
The Commercial Space Launch Act and its implementing reg-
ulations focused their licensing requirements on the safety and se-
curity aspects of the launch, which included third-party liability – 
partly since the United States as such might be held liable if such 
damage occurred in an international setting triggering the applica-
tion of the Liability Convention.82 Thus, a license is to be granted 
“[c]onsistent with the public health and safety, safety of property, 
and national security and foreign policy interests of the United 
States”;83 the licensing authority “may establish procedures for 
safety approvals”84 or prescribe “any additional requirement neces-
sary to protect the public health and safety, safety of property, na-
tional security interests, and foreign policy interests of the United 
States.”85 
Once actual launches of private manned launch vehicles were 
being contemplated seriously, the FAA firstly was provided with 
the authority to, mirror-wise as it were to the launch, also regulate 
and exercise its licensing competence vis-à-vis the re-entry of such 
vehicles – as obviously these launch vehicles should also return 
safely, and, as a matter of fact, the operators-to-be were focusing on 
reusable vehicles for commercial reasons as well. This was purport-
edly done by way of the 1998 Commercial Space Act86 which re-
sulted in the Commercial Space Launch Act to be “amended (...) to 
address liability and government indemnification concerns and to 
address licensing authority for RLVs [reusable launch vehicles],” 
thus allowing the FAA already in principle to start licensing re-en-
try operations in addition to launches.87 
                                                                                                                      
 81 14 C.F.R. §440.11. Also, this provision actually addresses the required insurance 
coverage or financial responsibility of the licensee only. 
 82 Cf. Liability Convention, supra note 3, Arts. I(c), II, III. 
 83 E.g. 51 U.S.C. §50905(a)(1). 
 84 51 U.S.C. §50905(a)(2). 
 85 51 U.S.C. §50905(b)(2)(B). 
 86 Commercial Space Act, Pub. L. No. 105-303 (1998). The Act was enunciated for 
addressing several and rather varied issues of space commercialization and the resulting 
involvement of private entities in space operations. See Dempsey, supra note 70, 389-90. 
 87 Hughes & Rosenberg, supra note 44, 4. See also Id. at 19-24 (including references 
to FAA regulations drafted in consequence, 14 C.F.R. §401.5 (2000)). Cf. Commercial 
Space Act, supra note 83, §§14751-14753. 
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With the victory of Scaled Composites in the X-Prize contest88 
and the ensuing establishment of Virgin Galactic this process 
quickly gave rise to the conclusion that the most appropriate way 
to handle such flights on a more consolidated basis in the future 
would be to adapt the regime of the Commercial Space Launch Act, 
which had regulated launch activities precisely for similar reasons 
of public interests (notably safety-, liability-, and national security-
related) to the specifics of launches with humans on board.89 The 
result was the 2004 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act90 
amending the 1984/1988 Act to achieve such goals, followed by fur-
ther legal measures as part of the Code of Federal Regulations.91 
Most fundamentally, the licensing obligation was now also ap-
plied to re-entry, whereas formerly it only applied to launches.92 
‘Re-entry’ is defined to mean “to return or attempt to return, pur-
posefully, a reentry vehicle and its payload, crew, or space flight 
participants, if any, from Earth orbit or from outer space to 
Earth”;93 in other words, still a somewhat vague and potentially 
broad definition, as no specific point of begin of a re-entry phase is 
indicated (whilst that phase may of course be presumed to have 
ended at the latest upon actual landing). The House Committee on 
Science then fortunately shed some further light in narrowing this 
loose ‘definition’ down to “that phase of the overall space mission 
during which re-entry is intentionally initiated,” more specifically 
“when the vehicle’s attitude is oriented for propulsion firing to place 
the vehicle on its reentry trajectory.”94 This seems to allow deter-
mination of the beginning of the re-entry phase rather precisely. 
                                                                                                                      
 88 Note that the FAA licensed the first-ever private flight into the edge of outer space 
of Scaled Composites’ SpaceShipOne on 1 April 2004 using the Commercial Space 
Launch Act as amended in 1988. Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments, Pub. L. 
No. 100-657 (1988). Although an experimental airworthiness certificate under 14 C.F.R. 
Pts. 21 & 91 was also required. Hughes & Rosenberg, supra note 44, 37-8 & 66-7. 
 89 See Id. at 21 ff. and P. van Fenema, Suborbital Flights and ICAO, 30 AIR & SPACE 
L. 399-400 (2005). 
 90 Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 108-492 (2004). 
 91 To wit 14 C.F.R. Chap. III: Commercial Space Transportation, Federal Aviation 
Administration, Department of Transportation. 
 92 See also 51 U.S.C. §50904(a). See furthermore §§50904-50905, for the general li-
censing requirements. See also Hughes & Rosenberg, supra note 44, 21 ff. 
 93 51 U.S.C. §50902(13). 
 94 Commercial Space Act of 1997, H.R. Rep. No. 105-347, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. at 
21 (quoted in Hughes & Rosenberg, supra note 44, 20). See also Hughes & Rosenberg, 
supra note 44, 21. 
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Interestingly the broadness in particular of the applicable con-
cept of ‘launch’ allowed the FAA to de facto regulate the whole sub-
orbital trajectory at least as far as the near-term private sub-orbital 
flight projects are concerned, with the launch more or less seam-
lessly transitioning into the re-entry – and as far as public safety is 
directly at issue. 
Launch and re-entry operations are still far from routine and 
actually presumably still hazardous – witness the ‘informed con-
sent’ requirement giving rise to a strong defence by the operator 
against any claim for damage under contractual liability by a space-
flight participant now also giving rise to a waiver of liability.95 Con-
sequently, almost any behaviour of such a spaceflight participant 
that would be out of sync, whether during ascent, descent or even 
during the five minutes or so of micro-gravity to be experienced, 
such as for example what would make a spaceflight participant an 
‘unruly passenger’ as this concept is known in aviation, would raise 
safety-related concerns, hence at least in theory be addressable un-
der FAA rules, in the sense that licensing conditions could include 
specific requirements protecting the safety of flight in light of such 
‘unruly passengers.’ Whether such paper requirements could actu-
ally preclude such unruly behaviour from endangering the safety of 
flight, vice versa whether more forceful instruments were to be 
called for and would be feasible (such as requiring physical re-
straint), would then of course be the next issue to be addressed. 
Still, as long as sub-orbital flights do not provide transporta-
tion services across major sections of the globe effectively the com-
prehensive flight could essentially be thus regulated – as far as this 
concerns the safety-related activities in the broadest sense of the 
word. But what if two passengers marry on board or completely 
peacefully engage in another contract’s signature? Or if, indeed, 
they start taking commercially-valuable high-resolution pictures 
from their windows, noting that presumably this would fall outside 
of NOAA’s jurisdiction? 
                                                                                                                      
 95 Cf. Sec. 112, U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. See also R.A. 
Yates, State Law Limitations on the Liability of Spaceflight Operators, 9/1 THE SCITECH 
LAWYER 15 (Summer 2012) and T. Knutson, What is “Informed Consent” for Space-Flight 
Participants in the Soon-to-Launch Space Tourism Industry?, 33 J. SPACE L. 105 (2007). 
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This is where the issue of absence of ‘on-orbit’ jurisdiction – 
the standard US term for jurisdiction in the realm of outer space96 
– for the FAA as asserted by the US Congress becomes a real issue. 
The FAA was authorized only to license launch and re-entry,97 
wherefore this jurisdiction does not amount to proper commercial, 
civil, or criminal jurisdiction. This lack of ‘in-space jurisdiction’ 
would in particular start to become a problem once flights would be 
extended beyond the sub-orbital ‘hops’ currently envisaged.Such 
a development would also essentially open up a major gap between, 
on the one hand, the international liability and responsibility of the 
United States under the space treaties for example for damage 
caused or threatened by commercial spaceflight operations due to 
unruly passengers being the root cause of such damage or threat 
thereof, and, on the other hand, the seeming possibility for – espe-
cially – the FAA to try and make sure by way of regulation that 
such unruly passengers will be duly restrained and prosecuted. 
C. Jurisdiction over Celestial Bodies Resource Exploitation? 
Looking yet further ahead, such an absence of ‘in-space’ juris-
diction also would become problematic in case of missions launched 
for the purpose of celestial bodies resource exploitation. While the 
                                                                                                                      
 96 Cf. Perlman, supra note 13, 940-1. 
 97 Cf. 51 U.S.C. §50904 and Perlman, supra note 13, 930, 935-7. See also GOV’T 
ACCOUNT. OFF., INDUSTRY TRENDS, GOVERNMENT CHALLENGES, AND INTERNATIONAL 
COMPETITIVENESS ISSUES, GAO-12-836T, 19 (2012). Strictly speaking, §50904 only re-
fers to ‘launch’ and ‘re-entry,’ without specifying whether this does encompass (parts of) 
the flight in outer space, which of course also means that in the licensing process the 
FAA will keep an eye out also for what might happen in the outer space-portions of any 
space object’s flight, if only for international third-party liability reasons, and insert as 
possible relevant conditions, for example in a safety approval if at issue. Furthermore, 
firstly §50902(4), defines launch with reference to placing or trying to place spacecraft, 
manned or unmanned, into outer space, suggesting that the in-space part of the opera-
tions should no longer be defined as part of the launch – but since normal payload sepa-
ration does take place in outer space, one cannot simply assume that there is no FAA 
jurisdiction in outer space whatsoever as such. Secondly, it may be noted that 14 C.F.R. 
§440.11 requires insurance obligations under a launch license to cover the period up to 
thirty days from payload separation alternatively from the launch properly speaking, 
apparently extending FAA authority over the licensed operations to that extent into 
outer space also. The underlying rationale for these limitations largely seems to refer 
back to a hesitation on the part of the United States to exert extra-territorial jurisdiction 
in the ‘global commons’ of outer space. Cf. Perlman, supra note 13, 942ff. Nevertheless, 
the whole approach could obviously be made much more straightforward, simple, trans-
parent and coherent. 
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FAA could and would, again, regulate launch and re-entry, possibly 
extending somewhat into any in-between operations as long as re-
lated to the overall safety of the flight and the consequent re-entry, 
such jurisdiction normally speaking does not extend to any on-site 
harvesting operations of the licensee. This, in spite of the risk that 
such operations may invoke the United States’ international re-
sponsibility and liability, as well as require some US protection in 
the international realm in view of the discussion referred to earlier 
on political and legal ramifications.98 
While Title IV of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Compet-
itiveness Act represents a laudable effort to develop a first measure 
of US regulatory authority over private resource exploitation mis-
sions on celestial bodies, it still leaves open the question regarding 
which part of the US government should actually exercise that au-
thority for the purpose indicated, as it merely provides that a report 
is to be submitted around the time of writing “that specifies – (1) 
the authorities necessary to meet the international obligations of 
the United States, including authorization and continuing supervi-
sion by the Federal Government; and (2) recommendations for the 
allocation of responsibilities among Federal agencies for the activi-
ties” concerned.99 To that extent also the new Act still begs the ques-
tion how such ‘in-space’ jurisdiction should be established and ex-
ercised in the US context, in this particular realm of celestial bodies 
resource exploitation – and more generally in outer space when pri-
vate US companies are concerned. 
Again, the current absence of any detailed regime both gives 
rise to an unacceptable measure of legal uncertainty for any bona 
fide endeavours to undertake celestial bodies resource exploitation, 
and would allow the United States to take the lead and set the prec-
edent at the international level for such a regime. It would also, 
consequently, give the United States a strong legal argument to 
protect any such activities duly licensed, including with due regard 
for the global public interest as reflected in US obligations under 
international space law. 
For example, the licensing regime should reflect and respect 
the absence of territorial sovereignty and appropriation, the impos-
                                                                                                                      
 98 See supra at §III.D. 
 99 Sec. 51302(b). 
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sibility for permanent ownership of celestial bodies as such (as con-
trasting in particular to that over mineral resources once ex-
tracted), should not prejudice other states’ rights, interests and po-
tential activities with regard to the celestial body at issue, including 
in particular as regards scientific exploration, and should incorpo-
rate an appropriate registration, liability, and insurance regime. As 
said, the reference in Title IV to continued compliance by the 
United States with its international obligations should be seen as 
addressing precisely these issues.100 
V. TOWARDS SOME FORM OF ‘IN-SPACE’ JURISDICTION OVER 
SPACE OBJECTS IN THE US CONTEXT 
Interestingly, even apart from the specific realm of intellectual 
property right protection the United States does already exercise 
jurisdiction of a rather more comprehensive nature in outer space 
– namely when it comes to criminal jurisdiction per se. The Federal 
Criminal Code applies to “[a]ny vehicle (...) in space and on the reg-
istry of the United States pursuant to the [Outer Space Treaty] and 
the [Registration Convention], while that vehicle is in flight.”101 In 
other words, the United States applies its criminal jurisdiction on 
a quasi-territorial basis to US-registered space objects. 
While that application thus addresses crimes, including eco-
nomic crimes such as money laundering, in space, it might not seem 
to address more normal commercial behaviour, mining activities 
outside of US-registered space objects or even such events on board 
as ‘unruly passengers’ if they would not meet the threshold of crim-
inal conduct.102 
More importantly, it is far from clear how the US criminal law 
system would (attempt to) apply to such ‘in-space’ activities in prac-
tice, without any expert agency involved to make it work.In spite 
of its official stance that no boundary should be formally estab-
lished (yet) between airspace and outer space, this application of 
the Federal Criminal Code also implicitly recognizes the clear in-
ternational legal difference between the two realms. As for airspace 
namely, the Tokyo Convention – to which the United States is also 
                                                                                                                      
 100 See Sec. 51302. 
 101 18 U.S.C. §7(6) (2006), as quoted by Perlman, supra note 13, 937. 
 102 So e.g. Perlman, supra note 13, 937. 
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a party – provided that the state in whose airspace an aircraft reg-
istered with another state is flying is the primary state entitled to 
exercise its “criminal jurisdiction over an offence committed on 
board” that aircraft – although the former state should not do so 
unless other criteria apply.103 
What is missing, then, is firstly, some actual temporary en-
forcement competence. Like the captain of an aircraft, the ‘captain’ 
of a suborbital spaceship should perhaps be endowed with the right 
to exercise temporary police powers during flight in order to be able 
to take appropriate measures of physical restraint – as necessary 
and, of course, feasible – until formal enforcement can take over 
after landing (back on earth).104 Interestingly, the aforementioned 
Tokyo Convention in establishing such powers for an aircraft com-
mander does seem to apply to “any act regardless whether it is an 
‘offence’ that may or actually does jeopardize safety or good order 
and discipline on board. It would thus apply, e.g., to unruly conduct 
such as smoking on board when it is prohibited, use of electronic 
equipment when prohibited, rude behaviour” and suchlike.105 
Similar enforcement questions would have to be answered 
with respect to resource exploitation activities on celestial bodies, 
once allowed under a licensing system as per Title IV of the U.S. 
Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. 
Secondly, the application of federal law in civil and commercial 
matters over US-registered space objects and/or celestial bodies re-
source exploitation facilities should be principally established. Of 
course Congress might wish to effectively limit its application to 
                                                                                                                      
 103 Namely, if “(a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State [being over-
flown]; (b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent resident 
of such State; (c) the offence is against the security of such State; (d) the offence consists 
of a breach of any rules or regulations relating to the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in 
force in such State; [or] (e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the ob-
servance of any obligation of such State under a multilateral international agreement.” 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Art. 4, in 
conjunction with Art. 1(2), , Tokyo, 14 September 1963, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter 
Tokyo Convention]. See R. Abeyratne, Space Tourism – Parallel Synergies Between Air 
and Space Law?, 53 ZLW 190-3 (2004) and M. Chatzipanagiotis, The legal status of space 
tourists in the framework of commercial suborbital flights 43-4 (2011). 
 104 See Tokyo Convention, supra note 99, Art. 6-9. Cf. Perlman, supra note 13, 954 
(linking this to the US obligation under Art. VI of the Outer Space Treaty to authorize 
and continuously supervise its “national activities in outer space.” 
 105 M. MILDE, INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW AND ICAO 225 (2012) (emphasis added). 
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particular statutes or particular parts of a statute, and then deter-
mine which particular parts of, for example, family law, commercial 
law or contract law, would actually extend to such registered ob-
jects, and how. Carve-outs would probably be needed for example 
to the extent that the use of radio-frequencies would be involved, as 
per FCC competencies, respectively as far as concerning remote 
sensing activities as per NOAA competencies. All that, however, 
should not stand in the way of establishing such fundamental ‘in-
space’ jurisdiction in and of itself. 
As there is no inherent reason at the international level ob-
structing such exercise of US jurisdiction, the solution is essentially 
one that could and should be found by the United States itself. The 
main theoretical-legal problem the United States in that context 
would have to address, at least with respect to the sub-sector of pri-
vate human spaceflight, concerns the delimitation of airspace and 
outer space – which it has so far been unwilling to tackle head-on – 
as (only) in outer space such jurisdiction over registered spacecraft 
would not be faced with any substantive legal obstacle, but in air-
space the ruling ‘territorial’ sovereignty might well put such obsta-
cles in front of such exercise. 
Obviously, however, from the perspective of public interna-
tional law this is mainly a problem of international dimensions, 
namely once the airspace of other countries than the United States 
would be at issue. As long as such flights would only cross US air-
space and the parts of outer space above it, establishing ‘in-space’ 
jurisdiction would just require aligning the FAA’s AST authorities 
with the FAA’s competences in regulating the National Air 
Space.106 
This would for the time being not require any definitive deci-
sion on (1) where, vertically speaking, the boundary-line between 
the US National Air Space and outer space would lie, or even 
whether such a boundary should be determined at all; (2) whether 
‘on-orbit’ jurisdiction as the applicable label should not conse-
quently be formally replaced also in US documents with ‘in-space’ 
jurisdiction, requiring a solution at least in theory regarding the 
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extent to which the lower boundary of outer space would be equiv-
alent to the lowest possible orbit107; and/or (3) whether a workable 
definition of ‘space object’ for the purposes of arranging for US lia-
bilities under international space law can exist without reference 
to a well-defined area of ‘outer space’ into which such objects are 
intended to be launched. 
Following Perlman in his extensive analysis, there is on the 
one hand ample reason to expect a growing need for such regulation 
of more normal commercial and (un)civil behaviour on board of US-
registered vehicles, potentially being used for longer and longer 
flights, and on the other hand there do not exist principled obstacles 
even within the US context itself to the exercise of such US juris-
diction on a more profound and coherent basis than hitherto.108 
In between the extensive discussion at the 7th Annual Univer-
sity of Nebraska-Lincoln’s Washington Conference on Space Law 
on 3 November 2014 of the White Paper with key stakeholders from 
the various government agencies and the industry and the drafting 
of the present contribution, a Staff Working Draft dated 11 March 
2015109 had proposed to include a Section 7, entitled “Space author-
ity,” in the then-Bill on space resource mining being discussed, no-
tably stating the following: 
(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 120 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Transportation, in con-
sultation with the Secretary of State, the Administrator of the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the 
heads of other relevant Federal agencies shall— 
(…) 
(2) identify any gaps in oversight authority for the activities de-
scribed in paragraph (1); 
                                                                                                                      
 107 See for the discussions on this issue see M. BENKÖ & E. PLESCHER, SPACE LAW – 
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 108 See Perlman, supra note 13, 937-66. 
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(3) recommend an oversight regime that would prioritize safety, 
promote the U.S. commercial space sector, and meet the United 
States’ obligations under international treaties (…).110 
The initiative would thus have lied with the Secretary of 
Transportation, under whose aegis the FAA AST operates, whereas 
other relevant Federal agencies and NASA shall be consulted – pre-
sumably to ensure no extension of FAA AST jurisdiction for the pur-
pose would unduly encroach upon their respective authorities. 
Unfortunately, this proposed clause did not make it into the 
Act as it was enunciated November 2015; in particular, the sug-
gested lead role of the FAA was erased, and no Federal agency spe-
cifically named.111 Thus, there is no guarantee that other outcomes 
than providing the FAA AST with something close to ‘in-space’ ju-
risdiction could not occur, even if from a logical perspective this 
would be the clearly preferable course but in any event the first step 
seems to have been made. To paraphrase a well-weathered but 
never worn-out statement: this may well be a small step for a gov-
ernment, but a giant leap for commercial operators – at least in the 
United States. 
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